TITLE

Truth Café

AUTHOR(S)
Linville, Mark
PUB. DATE
September 2006
SOURCE
Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity;Sep2006, Vol. 19 Issue 7, p19
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Editorial
ABSTRACT
The article focuses on the philosophical views on truth under relativism. For relativists, truth is, well, relative. What may be true to one person may not be true for others. Thus, truth cannot be imposed to another person who may have his own perspectives. Being a relativist would mean having an impossible belief that truth is relative. There is no such things as a relativist.
ACCESSION #
22337015

 

Related Articles

  • Reply to Glanzberg, Soames and Weatherson. Cappelen, Herman; Hawthorne, John // Analysis;Jan2011, Vol. 71 Issue 1, p143 

    The authors comment on papers by Michael Glanzberg, Scott Soames and Brian Weatherson. For Weatherson, his methodological point states that inductive arguments designed to show either relativism or an alternative better explains some data should be evaluated. An argument for relativism about...

  • POPPER'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. Howson, Colin // Philosophical Quarterly;Apr84, Vol. 34 Issue 135, p143 

    Focuses on Popper's solution to the problem of induction. Inference to truth of universal statements; Dominance arguments of decision-theorists.

  • Truth and Provability—A Comment on Redhead. Raatikainen, Panu // British Journal for the Philosophy of Science;Sep2005, Vol. 56 Issue 3, p611 

    Michael Redhead's recent argument aiming to show that humanly certifiable truth outruns provability is critically evaluated. It is argued that the argument is at odds with logical facts and fails.

  • PUTTING THE HORSE BEFORE THE CART: A PRAGMATIST ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE. Augusto, Luís M. // Trans/Form/Acao;2011, Vol. 34 Issue 2, p135 

    The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach, I argue that by...

  • Three Problems for “strong” Modal Fictionalism. Nolan, Daniel // Philosophical Studies;Sep1997, Vol. 87 Issue 3, p259 

    The article analyzes three important difficulties of the theory of modality called ''Modal Fictionalism.'' These three problems, each constitute a reason for abandoning at least one version of modal fictionalism as unworkable. The essence of modal fictionalism is the claim that possible worlds...

  • THE SEARCH FOR MEANING: THE WORD. STOCKTON, EUGENE // Compass (10369686);Summer2014, Vol. 48 Issue 4, p31 

    The author presents a reflection of the search for meaning, pursuit of the True, the Good and the Beautiful. Topics include patterns of the truth, psychology, biblical typology, and the Words of God. The author emphasizes that the True, Good and the Beautiful pertain to one God whom people are...

  • Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible-world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude. Schurz, Gerhard; Weingartner, Paul // Synthese;Feb2010, Vol. 172 Issue 3, p415 

    Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of...

  • The folly of trying to define knowledge. Blome-Tillmann, Michael // Analysis;Jul2007, Vol. 67 Issue 295, p214 

    In this article the author attempts to show that warrant entails truth. In doing so he hopes to advance the argument of Trenton Merricks. The author lays out several steps which start with showing how warrant entails belief and discusses what his concept means. He then shows that how warrant is...

  • The Justificationist's Response to a Realist. Dummett, Michael // Mind;Jul2005, Vol. 114 Issue 455, p671 

    Justificationism differs from realism about how linguistic meaning is given, and hence in its associated conception of truth, and in particular in rejecting bivalence. Empirical discourse differs from mathematical primarily in that an effective decision-procedure for an empirical statement may...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics