TITLE

Investor Horizon and CEO Horizon Incentives

AUTHOR(S)
Cadman, Brian; Sunder, Jayanthi
PUB. DATE
July 2014
SOURCE
Accounting Review;Jul2014, Vol. 89 Issue 4, p1299
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and chief executive officer (CEO) horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders plan to sell their stock. Specifically, we use the initial public offering (IPO) setting in which venture capitalists (VCs) represent short-horizon, controlling investors with strong selling incentives after the IPO. We predict and find that VCs' short-term incentives influence CEO's annual horizon incentives following the IPO. At the same time, institutional monitoring limits the influence of VCs on annual, short-horizon incentives. To preempt this disciplining by market participants, VCs grant equity prior to the IPO that correspond with their short-horizons and result in shorter portfolio horizon incentives for the CEO after the IPO. We also document a positive relation between long-run abnormal stock returns and horizon incentives, consistent with horizon incentives influencing management actions.
ACCESSION #
97202995

 

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