TITLE

PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC SPENDING

AUTHOR(S)
Holcombe, Randall C.
PUB. DATE
December 1978
SOURCE
National Tax Journal;Dec78, Vol. 31 Issue 4, p373
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The median voter model, which is central to much of the public finance�public choice literature, predicts that under a system of majority rule, the alternative most preferred by the median voter will be chosen. This article demonstrates that when tax shares can be proposed as apart of a political platform, the party preferring a relatively high level of expenditures will have an advantage in winning elections. Furthermore, the level of government expenditures will be higher than if tax shares could not be included as a part of political platforms. After deriving this conclusion, the paper explores some implications of the finding.
ACCESSION #
9296510

 

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