TITLE

The competitive lever of strong boards and good governance

AUTHOR(S)
LÉVY, MAURICE
PUB. DATE
July 2013
SOURCE
Directors & Boards;2013 Annual Report, Vol. 37 Issue 4, p6
SOURCE TYPE
Trade Publication
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article offers the author's insights on corporate board members and good corporate governance. He explores whether corporate governance be guided exclusively by shareholders' interests, and the regulatory framework where the boards operate. He says that the boards should have the freedom of judgment and be free of conflicts of interests. He describes the five committees in a corporation including the audit committee, compensation committee, and the ad hoc committee.
ACCESSION #
89901029

 

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