The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience

Siegel, Susanna
February 2013
Philosophical Studies;Feb2013, Vol. 162 Issue 3, p697
Academic Journal
The article discusses the etiology of experience and its epistemic impact. It mentions that experience can be affected by various aspects such as beliefs, expectations and doubts. It states that experience is influenced by cognitive penetration, which primarily depends on the mental state of the person who preserves.


Related Articles

  • Siegel on the epistemic impact of 'checkered' experience. Fumerton, Richard // Philosophical Studies;Feb2013, Vol. 162 Issue 3, p733 

    The article discusses the impact of checkered experience in the justification of belief based on the study of Susanna Siegel. It mentions that belief would be considered epistemically irrational if it is justified by a sense experience that is based on checkered past. On the other hand, beliefs...

  • Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Siegel, Susanna // Philosophical Studies;Feb2013, Vol. 162 Issue 3, p749 

    The article offers the author's insights on the justification of beliefs based on its etiology and epistemic rationality. The author states that wishful thinking, prejudice and fearful thinking are all from poor beliefs which may due to mental states that can influence the justification. She...

  • Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals. Anderson, Charity // Philosophical Studies;Feb2014, Vol. 167 Issue 3, p597 

    It is widely acknowledged that epistemic modals admit of inter-subjective flexibility. This paper introduces intra-subjective flexibility for epistemic modals and draws on this flexibility to argue that fallibilism is consistent with the standard account of epistemic modals.

  • Knowledge and conviction. Anderson, David // Synthese;Jul2012, Vol. 187 Issue 2, p377 

    Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect...

  • On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Bjerring, Jens; Hansen, Jens; Pedersen, Nikolaj // Synthese;Jul2014, Vol. 191 Issue 11, p2445 

    Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people's private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on...

  • Knowledge is normal belief. Ball, Brian // Analysis;Jan2013, Vol. 73 Issue 1, p69 

    In this article, I offer a new analysis of knowledge: knowledge, I claim, is normal belief. I begin with what I take to be the conceptual truth that knowledge is epistemically justified, or permissible, belief. I then argue that this in turn is simply doxastically normal belief, first clarifying...

  • Value and Epistemic Normativity. Owens, David // Teorema;2013, Vol. 32 Issue 3, p35 

    Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or the value of truth or else in the value of successful agency. Here it is proposed that epistemic norms derive their authority from the fact that it is good for us to be subject to such norms. These norms serve...

  • COLLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY. Gilbert, Margaret // Episteme (Edinburgh University Press);Oct2004, Vol. 1 Issue 2, p95 

    I have argued for the importance of collective epistemology both in its own right and in relation to general epistemology. As to the latter, if we are to develop adequate general theories of knowledge, belief, and so on, we need to take the collective versions of these phenomena into account...

  • The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised. Allo, Patrick // Philosophical Studies;Apr2011, Vol. 153 Issue 3, p417 

    The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a...


Read the Article


Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics