The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach

Tingley, Dustin H.; Walter, Barbara F.
April 2011
International Organization;Apr2011, Vol. 65 Issue 2, p343
Academic Journal
What effect does repeated play have on reputation building? The literature on international relations remains divided on whether, when, and how reputation matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict. We examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Using comparative statics from a repeated entry-deterrence game, we isolate how incentives for reputation building should change as the number of entrants changes. We find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off, but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted. In order to explain this, we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population. Our research suggests that rational-choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated.


Related Articles

  • The political economy of North-South relations: How much change? Hansen, Roger D. // International Organization;Autumn75, Vol. 29 Issue 4, p921 

    At the present time the spectrum of views on the probabilities for major change in the present political economy of North-South relations is very broad. Some scholars predict a significant increase in the bargaining strength of the developing countries; others suggest that the asymmetrical...

  • Vertrauen lohnt sich. Brugger, Philipp; Hasenclever, Andreas; Kasten, Lukas // Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB);2013, Vol. 20 Issue 2, p65 

    This article offers an overview of interstate trust as a theoretical and empirical concept in IR. We first contrast information-based trust with a different understanding which focuses on trust as the suspension of uncertainty. We emphasize the ontological surplus of the suspension-based type of...

  • Teoria dos Jogos e Microssociologia: Avenidas de Colaboração. Kirschbaum, Charles; Iwai, Tatiana // RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea;ene2011, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p138 

    No abstract available.

  • If you had been silent, you would have remained an analyst: Experimental evidence for reputational herding. Bedke, Nils; Bizer, Kilian; Spiwoks, Markus // NeuroPsychoEconomics Conference Proceedings;2007, p17 

    The present study looks into the experimental examination of the Reputational Herding theory. The investigation proposes a differentiation of rational and irrational herd behavior. It has been observed that out of the 95% of subjects displaying herd behavior, around 81% can be referred to as...

  • Explaining the Social Contract. Ernst, Zachary // British Journal for the Philosophy of Science;Mar2001, Vol. 52 Issue 1 

    Brian Skyrms has argued that the evolution of the social contract may be explained using the tools of evolutionary game theory. I show in the first half of this paper that the evolutionary game-theoretic models are often highly sensitive to the specific processes that they are intended to...

  • Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power. Sechser, Todd S. // International Organization;Fall2010, Vol. 64 Issue 4, p627 

    States typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries, yet their threats often fail. Why? Expanding on a standard model of international crisis bargaining, I argue that a theory of reputation-building can help shed light on this puzzle. The model casts reputation as a...

  • Osborne's Trilogy: A Critique of the Management Philosophy of David Osborne. Lane, Jan-Erik // Halduskultuur;2006, Vol. 7, p6 

    Given the public attention rendered to Osborne's writings on public management, it is both timely and necessary to provide a critique of his key books with various coauthors. His message is a simplistic version of NPM without any foundation in organisational theory or rational choice. His...

  • Behavioral International Law and Economics. van Aaken, Anne // Harvard International Law Journal;Summer2014, Vol. 55 Issue 2, p421 

    Whereas the rational choice approach to international law has been widely accepted in legal scholarship and international relations theory, challenges to the rational choice paradigm in economic analysis of international law have hitherto not been systematically explored. Nevertheless,...

  • To Fight or Not to Fight War's Payoffs to U.S. Leaders and to the American People. HIGGS, ROBERT // Independent Review;Summer2011, Vol. 16 Issue 1, p141 

    The article discusses the payoffs of war for U.S. leaders and the American public and decisions to initiate or avoid war when there is an existential threat that puts the nation in danger and when there is no such threat. The discussion focuses on the ideas that most wars that gave U.S....


Read the Article


Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics