The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised

Allo, Patrick
April 2011
Philosophical Studies;Apr2011, Vol. 153 Issue 3, p417
Academic Journal
The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.


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