TITLE

CONFLICTING HIGHER AND LOWER ORDER EVIDENCES IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT ABOUT RELIGION

AUTHOR(S)
KRAFT, JAMES
PUB. DATE
March 2010
SOURCE
Forum Philosophicum;Spring2010, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p65
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one's belief when one discovers an epistemic peer with conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be seen to apply also in the latter.
ACCESSION #
53739334

 

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