TITLE

Five Reasons to Support Shareholder Primacy

AUTHOR(S)
Elson, Charles M.
PUB. DATE
April 2010
SOURCE
NACD Directorship;Apr/May2010, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p63
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses the reasons why shareholder primacy should be supported. The author highlights the implications of failure to prioritize the interests of shareholders' interests which he believes will drive away investors and capital. He asserts the role of shareholder primacy as the key to the entire capital system. He underlines the problems associated with the stakeholder system. He cites the significance of director compensation as proof of the importance of shareholder primacy.
ACCESSION #
49740963

 

Related Articles

  • Boards And Investors: Views On Executive Pay. Kay, Ira T. // Corporate Board;May/Jun2008, Vol. 29 Issue 170, p7 

    No issue has ignited more shareholder fury than top executive pay plans that seem excessive, detached from results, and too easily gamed. As the following study results show, directors and investors approach pay issues from very different perspectives--yet share the view that the end results...

  • Start rolling back the CEO options express. Ferlauto, Richard // Pensions & Investments;2/5/2001, Vol. 29 Issue 3, p12 

    Reports the complaint of institutional investors against executive pay packages. Effect of giving excessive equity allocations; List of shareholder agenda for shareholder resolution; Implication of increasing proportion of companies; Impact of increasing severance of pay-off packages for failed...

  • Pay referendum can drive value for shareholders. Lane, Marc J. // Crain's Chicago Business;5/7/2007, Vol. 30 Issue 19, p18 

    The author comments on the issue regarding the compensation packages offered by public companies to their executives in the U.S. According to the author, corporate shareholders should have the legal right to weigh in on the compensation packages that are awarded to their top executives. However,...

  • Investor Horizon and CEO Horizon Incentives. Cadman, Brian; Sunder, Jayanthi // Accounting Review;Jul2014, Vol. 89 Issue 4, p1299 

    We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and chief executive officer (CEO) horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these...

  • Pay must be made clearer to investors. Jordon, Dearbail // Finance Week (Centaur Communications);11/16/2005, p12 

    The article presents the author's view on the challenges associated with the directors' remuneration policies in Great Britain. She claims that the move by companies to set out all elements of executive pay under the Director Remuneration Report Regulations introduced in 2002 is problematical...

  • In whose interest?  // Pensions & Investments;4/17/2006, Vol. 34 Issue 8, p10 

    The article focuses on a joint study of mutual fund proxy voting on executive compensation. The findings should wake up investors, especially 401(k) and other defined contribution plan sponsors and investors using mutual funds, to their fiduciary obligation. The study helps show which mutual...

  • Say On Pay: Results From Overseas. Deane, Stephen // Corporate Board;Jul/Aug2007, Vol. 28 Issue 165, p11 

    The idea of giving shareholders a say in approving top executive pay has been a powerful one this proxy season. Though such ‘say on pay’ powers are new to the U.S., they are already well established in a number of other countries. How well such mandates have succeeded (and where...

  • Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay. Fried, Jesse M. // Texas Law Review;Apr2011, Vol. 89 Issue 5, p1113 

    This Article identifies a potential cost to public investors of tying executive pay to the stock's future value--even its long-term value. In particular, such an arrangement can incentivize executives to engage in share repurchases (when the current stock price is low) and equity issuances (when...

  • SHARE DEVILS. Stensholt, John // BRW;3/26/2009, Vol. 31 Issue 12, p44 

    The article focuses on the financial condition of several companies and financial executives. It notes that Lev Mizikovski, the managing director of Tamawood, and the 77% shareholder has requested the board to cancel his $150,000 salary. It also mentions that Daryl Holmes, the managing director...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics