Economía y ética. Una revisión con base en la teoría del bienestar

Guzmán, Cristian E. Leriche; Godínez, Víctor M. Sosa; Osorio, Óscar R. Caloca
May 2009
Polis (07176554);2009, Vol. 8 Issue 23, p95
Academic Journal
The investigation approaches the dilemma that implies the relation between economy and ethics, which derives from the separation between moral philosophy and positive economy. To analyze it through the welfare theory allows us to approach the rules of a cognitive ethics or moral psychology, by means of a different proposal of the representative individual. The purpose is to offer some elements to observe economy from another perspective, by growing closer links between theory and ethics.


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