TITLE

Sophisticated preference aggregation

AUTHOR(S)
Sanver, M. Remzi; Sel�uk, �zer
PUB. DATE
June 2009
SOURCE
Social Choice & Welfare;Jun2009, Vol. 33 Issue 1, p73
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
A Sophisticated Social Welfare Function (SSWF) is a mapping from profiles of individual preferences into a sophisticated preference which is a pairwise weighted comparison of alternatives. We characterize Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs in terms of oligarchies that are induced by some power distribution in the society. This is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality to anonymous aggregation rules. Our results generalize the impossibility theorem of Arrow (Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York, 1951) and the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma, University of Chicago, unpublished manuscript, 1969).
ACCESSION #
37699492

 

Related Articles

  • Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule. Umezawa, Masashi // Social Choice & Welfare;Jun2009, Vol. 33 Issue 1, p151 

    This paper studies coalitional strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences that map preference profiles into sets of alternatives. In particular, we focus on the Pareto rule, which associates the set of Pareto optimal alternatives with each preference profile, and examine whether or not...

  • SOCIAL WELFARE AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES. Hinich, Melvin J.; Ordeshook, Peter C. // Public Choice;Fall1971, Vol. 11, p73 

    Deals with the social welfare and electoral competition in democratic societies. Similarities between an election and a market; Description of Pareto optimality; Contrast between the social choices provided by the electoral process with the location of the social welfare optimum.

  • Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives. Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. // Social Choice & Welfare;Jul2007, Vol. 29 Issue 1, p83 

    For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow’s IIA.

  • PREFERENCE PROXIMITY AND ANONYMOUS SOCIAL CHOICE. Baigent, Nick // Quarterly Journal of Economics;Feb87, Vol. 102 Issue 1, p161 

    This article establishes some of the limitations implied by proximity preservation. It has been shown that given a symmetric power structure, then proximity preservation precludes respect for unanimity in the case of social welfare functions and social choice functions. In addition, the weak...

  • PREFERENCE PROXIMITY AND ANONYMOUS SOCIAL CHOICE. Baigent, Nick // Quarterly Journal of Economics;Feb87, Vol. 102 Issue 1, p161 

    This article establishes some of the limitations implied by proximity preservation. It has been shown that given a symmetric power structure, then proximity preservation precludes respect for unanimity in the case of social welfare functions and social choice functions. In addition, the weak...

  • Impossibility results in the axiomatic theory of Intertemporal choice. Packel, Edward // Public Choice;1980, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p219 

    Shows that for infinite generation, transitive, intertemporal choice procedures the familiar conditions of Pareto optimality and independence together with the equity condition of stationarity are incompatible unless one is willing to accept a dictatorship. Commonly used approach in...

  • Preference densities and social choices. Richter, Marcel; Wong, Kam-Chau // Economic Theory;Aug2008, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p225 

    We discuss a ranking method that allows social pairwise rankings of alternatives to depend on more than just individuals’ pairwise rankings. This violates Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, but allows Borda’s rank-order counting, which provides a limited...

  • Probabilistic Social Choice Based on Simple Voting Comparisons. Fishburn, P. C. // Review of Economic Studies;Oct84, Vol. 51 Issue 4, p683 

    A social choice procedure is developed for selecting an alternative from a finite set on the basis of paired-comparison voting. Ballot data are used to construct a lottery on the alternatives that is socially as preferred as every other lottery. The constructed lottery is then used to select a...

  • OPMERKINGEN EN AANTEKENINGEN - COMMUNICATIONS. Hennipman, P. // De Economist (0013-063X);Jul1993, Vol. 141 Issue 2, p290 

    Presents a response to a comment made by M. Blaug about an article on the theory of Paretian welfare economics. Arguments of Blaug on the difference between normative and positive economics; Misinterpretation on the issue of consumer sovereignty as a value judgment; Concept of social welfare;...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics