TITLE

1. The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control

AUTHOR(S)
DALTON, DAN R.; HITT, MICHAEL A.; CERTO, S. TREVIS; DALTON, CATHERINE M.
PUB. DATE
January 2007
SOURCE
Academy of Management Annals;2007, Vol. 1 Issue 1, p1
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
A central tenet of agency theory is that there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners and managers diverge. In those circumstances, and for a variety of reasons, managers may be able to exact higher rents than are reasonable or than the owners of the firm would otherwise accord them. While that foundational element of agency theory is secure, other elements derived directly from agency theory are far less settled. Indeed, even after some 75 years of conceptualization and empirical research, the three principal approaches that have long been proposed to mitigate the fundamental agency problem remain contentious. Accordingly, we provide a review of the fundamental agency problem and its mitigation through independence, equity, and the market for corporate control.
ACCESSION #
35980415

 

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