Knowledge and Explanation

Jenkins, C. S.
June 2006
Canadian Journal of Philosophy;Jun2006, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p137
Academic Journal
This article discusses the role of knowledge in people's lives. Knowledge is simply a normal true belief, a belief that can be explained. The normal way of explaining knowledge is based on the concept of how familiar the person can justify it. The author further suggests that a person must explore his attitudes towards explanation and its explanatory value thereon.


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