On the Extension of the Utilitarian and Suppes–Sen Social Welfare Relations to Infinite Utility Streams

Banerjee, Kuntal
October 2006
Social Choice & Welfare;Oct2006, Vol. 27 Issue 2, p327
Academic Journal
Extensions of a utilitarian and a Suppes–Sen grading principle defined on infinite utility streams are characterized with a stronger notion of Anonymity and without any consistency postulate. The relative merits of the Extended Utilitarian relation are discussed and its rankings are compared with those of the overtaking criterion and the Basu–Mitra Utilitarian relation.


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