TITLE

PERMIT TRADING AND STABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS

AUTHOR(S)
Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos; Finus, Michael
PUB. DATE
May 2006
SOURCE
Journal of Applied Economics;May2006, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p19
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We consider seven different permit allocation schemes. Two "pragmatic schemes" allocate permits according to a uniform emission reduction quota, five "equitable schemes" allocate permits based on some normative criteria frequently discussed in the literature permit trading can raise participation and the success of climate agreements, but pragmatic schemes are superior to equitable ones.
ACCESSION #
21080338

 

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics