TITLE

Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage

AUTHOR(S)
Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.
PUB. DATE
June 2005
SOURCE
Journal of Corporation Law;Summer2005, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p807
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article examines issues on executive compensation at Fannie Mae in the United States, focusing perverse incentives, nonperformance pay and camouflage. Problems arise regarding Fannie Mae's executive pay arrangements, specifically during the period 2000 to 2004 including perverse incentives, soft landing, pay decoupled from performance and camouflage.
ACCESSION #
20810219

 

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics