TITLE

Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets

AUTHOR(S)
Bolton, Patrick; Scheinkman, José; Wei Xiong
PUB. DATE
June 2005
SOURCE
Journal of Corporation Law;Summer2005, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p721
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article focuses on pay for short-term performance specifically relevant to executive compensation in speculative markets in the United States. It argues that the root cause behind corporate scandals associated with chief executive pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s, and has provided evidence on reconciling executive pay with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets.
ACCESSION #
20810209

 

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