TITLE

There's no time like the present

AUTHOR(S)
Button, Tim
PUB. DATE
April 2006
SOURCE
Analysis;Apr2006, Vol. 66 Issue 2, p130
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article comments on the views and perceptions of no-futurists on the reality of the past and the present, while the future is not real. No-futurists believe that the present moment is privileged in being the last moment of time. Branching-futurists believe something similar, that is, they hold that the past and the present are linear and actual, but that the future consists of branching possibilities.
ACCESSION #
20238402

 

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