TITLE

Truth and Provability—A Comment on Redhead

AUTHOR(S)
Raatikainen, Panu
PUB. DATE
September 2005
SOURCE
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science;Sep2005, Vol. 56 Issue 3, p611
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Michael Redhead's recent argument aiming to show that humanly certifiable truth outruns provability is critically evaluated. It is argued that the argument is at odds with logical facts and fails.
ACCESSION #
18366710

 

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