TITLE

PREFERENCE PROXIMITY AND ANONYMOUS SOCIAL CHOICE

AUTHOR(S)
Baigent, Nick
PUB. DATE
February 1987
SOURCE
Quarterly Journal of Economics;Feb87, Vol. 102 Issue 1, p161
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
This article establishes some of the limitations implied by proximity preservation. It has been shown that given a symmetric power structure, then proximity preservation precludes respect for unanimity in the case of social welfare functions and social choice functions. In addition, the weak Pareto principle is precluded in the case of social choice functions. The proximity preservation lacks the asymptotic aspects of continuity. A social welfare function is anonymous if it is invariant to any permutation of the elements in any profile.
ACCESSION #
17180340

 

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