TITLE

SOCIAL WELFARE AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

AUTHOR(S)
Hinich, Melvin J.; Ordeshook, Peter C.
PUB. DATE
September 1971
SOURCE
Public Choice;Fall1971, Vol. 11, p73
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Deals with the social welfare and electoral competition in democratic societies. Similarities between an election and a market; Description of Pareto optimality; Contrast between the social choices provided by the electoral process with the location of the social welfare optimum.
ACCESSION #
17166783

 

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