Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: What’s the Question?

Baker, Deane-Peter
April 2005
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion;Apr2005, Vol. 57 Issue 2, p77
Academic Journal
Alvin Plantinga’sWarranted Christian Beliefis without questionone of the central texts of the Reformed epistemology movement. Critiques of Plantinga’s defence have been both multiple and varied. As varied as these responses are, however, it is my contention that many of them amount to the same thing. It is the purpose of this paper to offer an overview of the main lines of attack that have been directed as Plantinga’s project, and thereafter to show how many, if not most, of these objections can be understood as versions or aspects of the same criticism, what I call the ’Inadequacy Thesis’.


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