TITLE

COLLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY

AUTHOR(S)
Gilbert, Margaret
PUB. DATE
October 2004
SOURCE
Episteme (Edinburgh University Press);Oct2004, Vol. 1 Issue 2, p95
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
I have argued for the importance of collective epistemology both in its own right and in relation to general epistemology. As to the latter, if we are to develop adequate general theories of knowledge, belief, and so on, we need to take the collective versions of these phenomena into account Apart from the matter of such general theories, if we are to make sense of the human world, we need to understand the nature and functioning of collective cognitive states as well as the nature and functioning of the cognitive states of human individuals. We also need to understand the relationship between these two types of cognitive state, for example, the ways in which they may influence one another. In this essay I focused on the topic of collective belief, I argued against an account that is likely to spring to mind when one first considers the question, and in favor of the account I labeled the plural subject account. This alone satisfies the criteria of adequacy for such an account that I specified. The subject of collective epistemology is still in its infancy. It is to be hoped that more and more theorists will pay it the attention it deserves, so it grows to maturity.
ACCESSION #
16726338

 

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