TITLE

Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences

AUTHOR(S)
McCarthy, David
PUB. DATE
April 1998
SOURCE
Philosophical Studies;Apr1998, Vol. 90 Issue 1, p57
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article probes whether an agent's act is permissible depends, in part, on what the consequences of the act will be, and not on what she believes they will be. There are many variations on this. For example, justification may have more to do with what it is reasonable for the agent to believe rather than what she actually believes. And there are many different kinds of moral theory in which these kinds of distinctions can be made. On some theories, only the consequences of acts are relevant to their permissibility; on others, things beside consequences are relevant.
ACCESSION #
16630357

 

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