TITLE

Three Problems for “strong” Modal Fictionalism

AUTHOR(S)
Nolan, Daniel
PUB. DATE
September 1997
SOURCE
Philosophical Studies;Sep1997, Vol. 87 Issue 3, p259
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article analyzes three important difficulties of the theory of modality called ''Modal Fictionalism.'' These three problems, each constitute a reason for abandoning at least one version of modal fictionalism as unworkable. The essence of modal fictionalism is the claim that possible worlds do not literally exist. The general picture offered by modal fictionalism looks quite attractive. The first modal factionalism considered recommends a fictional approach not only to possible worlds, but to modality as well. The other two varieties have in common the claim that normal modal statements are objectively true or false, and furthermore that some statements about the possibility of the nonactual or statements about things being necessary are in fact true.
ACCESSION #
16630310

 

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