TITLE

INTROSPECTION, PERCEPTION, AND EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE

AUTHOR(S)
Cassam, Quassim
PUB. DATE
April 2004
SOURCE
Monist;Apr2004, Vol. 87 Issue 2, p255
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Examines the epistemic privileges of introspective knowledge, and the frailties of perceptual knowledge. Disagreements over the precise nature and extent of first-person authority; Distinction between introspective and perceptual knowledge; Examination of the privileges that McKinney attributes to first-person introspective knowledge.
ACCESSION #
14166540

 

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