Kekes, John
January 1975
Philosophical Quarterly;Jan75, Vol. 25 Issue 98, p28
Academic Journal
Discusses various forms of skepticism, which refers to the attack upon reason. Use of rationalism; Exclusiveness of induction and deduction by Humean skepticism; Relationship of skepticism to a realistic or nominalistic analysis of classification; Regard for skepticism as an epistemological doctrine.


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