TITLE

Don't abandon SALT II

AUTHOR(S)
Earle II, Ralph
PUB. DATE
August 1986
SOURCE
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;Aug/Sep1986, Vol. 42 Issue 7, p8
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Discusses the U.S. stand on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II. Examination of U.S. President Ronald Reagan's breach of the unratified treaty; Implications of the Reagan decision on the U.S.-Soviet Union relations; Analysis of the U.S. justification for the decision to breach the treaty.
ACCESSION #
11077621

 

Related Articles

  • A rejoinder. Hardin, Russell // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;Apr1985, Vol. 41 Issue 4, p53 

    Replies to Richard Bilder's critique of the author's argument that formal and legally binding treaties between the U.S. and the Soviet Union have inhibited progress in achieving arms control. Areas in which treaties are best at ratifying the status quo; Steady escalation in armaments that have...

  • Over the Shoulder.  // National Review;6/8/1979, Vol. 31 Issue 23, p717 

    The article addresses the concerns surrounding the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II (SALT) in the U.S. It presents the results of polls concerning SALT. It explores the position of some senators regarding the treaty. It stresses the problem associated with the verification of the treaty.

  • Remember the Hivites. Beilenson, Lawrence W. // National Review;10/12/1979, Vol. 31 Issue 41, p1284 

    The article enumerates the reasons why the United States should oppose the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II. According to the author, the U. S. should not support SALT because it would be risking the survival of the American nation on a treaty with the Soviets who are likely to breach...

  • Arms Limitation Treaties Timeline Chronology of Major Events.  // International Debates;Oct2010, Vol. 8 Issue 7, p4 

    The article presents a chronology of events in arms limitation treaties between the U.S. and Russia. These treaties include the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) which calls for both countries to reduce their strategic nuclear forces. In January 1993,...

  • Formal treaties and tacit agreements: an exchange. Bilder, Richard B. // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;Apr1985, Vol. 41 Issue 4, p51 

    Comments on correspondent Russell Hardin's argument in his article 'Contracts, Promises, and Arms Control' that formal and legally binding treaties between the U.S. and the Soviet Union have inhibited progress in achieving arms control. Questioning of Hardin's suggestion that non-binding...

  • Human rights linkage. Evangelista, Matthew A. // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;Mar1982, Vol. 38 Issue 3, p47 

    The article presents the author's opinion on the Soviet Union's position on arms control measures. He views that despite the reprehensible nature of human rights violations, the Soviet Union has followed the arms control measures and complied with arms control treaties. The Soviet Union has...

  • If Pigs Had Wings. Navrozov, Lev // National Review;10/12/1979, Vol. 31 Issue 41, p1287 

    The article addresses the issue of whether Soviet compliance to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) can be verified by United States intelligence. According to the author, efforts by various groups to dispute the findings of U. S. intelligence that SALT is verifiable have been opposed...

  • Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) drawdown analyses. Owens, Douglas W.; Parnell, Gregory S. // Operations Research;May/Jun96, Vol. 44 Issue 3, p425 

    This study investigated the feasibility and impacts of various U.S. and USSR time-phased strategic force structure reduction alternatives (commonly referred to as drawdowns) under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The study resulted from the Soviet Union's request for a U.S. position...

  • The Politics of Compliance. Earle, II, Ralph // Harvard International Review;Aug/Sep1988, Vol. 10 Issue 6, p13 

    The article discusses the compliance and verification issues of the arms control agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The most essential factor of the compliance of any agreement is political will and any agreement can be a success only if the parties involved want it to be....

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics